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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a many-valued modal framework to
formalize reasoning with both graded preferences and propositions, in the
style of van Benthem et al.’s classical modal logics for preferences. To do
so, we start from Bou et al.’s minimal modal logic over a finite and linearly
ordered residuated lattice. We then define appropriate extensions on a
multi-modal language with graded modalities, both for weak and strict
preferences, and with truth-constants. Actually, the presence of truth-
constants in the language allows us to show that the modal operators 
and ✸ of the minimal modal logic are inter-definable. Finally, we propose
an axiomatic system for this logic in an extended language (where the
preference modal operators are definable), and prove completeness with
respect to the intended graded preference semantics.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about preferences is a topic that has received a lot of attention in
Artificial Intelligence since many years, see for instance [HGY12, DHKP11,
Kac11]. Two main approaches to representing and handling preferences have
been developed: the relational and the logic-based approaches.
In the classical setting, a (weak) preference binary relation P ⊆ W × W
on a set of alternatives or worlds W is usually modeled as a preorder, i.e. a
reflexive and transitive relation, where (a, b) ∈ P is understood as b is at least
as preferred as a.
∗This is a revised and properly extended version of the conference papers [VEG17a] and
[VEG18].
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When preference becomes a matter of degree, preference relations can be
attached degrees (usually belonging to the unit interval [0, 1]) of fulfillment or
strength, so they become fuzzy relations. A weak fuzzy preference relation P
on a set W will be now a fuzzy preorder P : W ×W → [0, 1], where P (a, b) is
interpreted as the degree in which b is at least as preferred as a. Given a t-norm
∗, a fuzzy relation P is a ∗-preorder if it satisfies
• reflexivity: P (a, a) = 1 for each a ∈W , and
• ∗-transitivity: P (a, b) ∗ P (b, c) 6 P (a, c) for each a, b, c ∈ W .
The most influential reference is the book by Fodor and Roubens [FR94], that
was followed by many other works like, for example [DBM07, DBM10, DMB04,
DBM08, DGLM08]. In this setting, many questions have been discussed, like
e.g. the definition of the strict fuzzy order associated to a fuzzy preorder (see
for example [Bod08a, Bod08b, BD08, EGV18]).
The basic assumption in logical-based approaches is that preferences have
structural properties that can be suitably described in a formalized language.
This is the main goal of the so-called preference logics, see e.g. [HGY12].
The first logical systems to reason about preferences go back to S. Hallde´n
[Hal57] and to von Wright [vW63, vW72, Liu10]. Other related works are
[EP06, vBvOR05]. More recently van Benthem et al. in [vBGR09] have pre-
sented a modal logic-based formalization of representing and reasoning with
preferences. In that paper the authors first define a basic modal logic with two
unary modal operators ✸ and ✸<, together with the universal and existential
modalities, A and E respectively, and axiomatize them. Using these primitive
modalities, they consider several (definable) binary modalities to capture differ-
ent notions of preference relations on classical propositions, and show complete-
ness with respect to the intended preference semantics. Finally they discuss
their systems in relation to von Wright axioms for ceteris paribus preferences
[vW63]. On the other hand, with the motivation of formalizing a compara-
tive notion of likelihood, Halpern studies in [Hal97] different ways to extend
preorders on a set X to preorders on subsets of X and their associated strict
orders. He studies their properties and relations among them, and he also pro-
vides an axiomatic system for a logic of relative likelihood, that is proved to
be complete with respect to what he calls preferential structures, i.e. Kripke
models with preorders as accessibility relations. All these works relate to the
classical (modal) logic and crisp preference (accessibility) relations.
In the fuzzy (or graded) setting,1 as far as the authors are aware, there
are not many formal logic-based approaches to reasoning with fuzzy preference
relations, see e.g. [BEFG01]. More recently, in the first part of [EGV18] we
1In this paper we will be using the term fuzzy indistinctly to refer to preference relations or
propositions valued on the real unit interval [0, 1] or on a finite linearly ordered scale, rather
than using the general term many-valued for the latter case. Indeed, it is commonly accepted
within the community of mathematical fuzzy logic to consider the class of fuzzy logics with
an underlying notion of comparative truth, and this is captured by logics of linearly ordered
algebras of truth-values, regardless they are finite or not, see e.g. [BC06].
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studied and characterized different forms to define fuzzy relations on the set
P(W) of subsets of W , from a fuzzy preorder on W , in a similar way to the one
followed in [Hal97, vBGR09] for classical preorders, while in the second part
we have semantically defined and axiomatized several two-tiered graded modal
logics to reason about different notions of preferences on crisp propositions,
see also [EGV17]. On the other hand, in [VEG17a] we considered a modal
framework over a many-valued logic with the aim of generalizing Van Benthem
et al.’s modal approach to the case of both fuzzy preference accessibility relations
and fuzzy propositions. To do that, we first extended the many-valued modal
framework of [BEGR11] for only a necessity operator  by defining an axiomatic
system with both necessity and possibility operators and✸ over the same class
of models. Unfortunately, in the last part of that paper, there is a mistake in
the proof of Theorem 3 (particularly, equation (4)). This left open the question
of properly axiomatizing the logic of graded preferences defined there.
In this paper we address this problem, extending the work developed in
[VEG18]. We propose an alternative approach to provide a complete axiomatic
system for a logic of fuzzy preferences, studying first the logic with reflexive
graded preference relations (as in [VEG18]) an later, extending this system with
the corresponding strict (irreflexive) preferences. Namely, given a finite MTL-
chainB (i.e. a finite totally ordered residuated lattice) as set of truth values, and
given an B-valued preference Kripke model (W,P, e), with P a fuzzy preorder
valued on A, we consider the a-cuts Pb of the relation P for every b ∈ B, and
for each b-cut Pb, we consider the corresponding modal operators b,✸b. These
operators are easier to be axiomatized than the original ,✸, since the relations
Pb are not fuzzy any longer, but a nested set of classical (crisp) relations.
The good news are that, in our rich (multi-modal) logical framework, we can
show that the original modal operators  and ✸ are definable, and vice-versa
if we expand the logic with Monteiro-Baaz’s ∆ operator. Thus, we define and
axiomatize a conservative extension of the logic where the original operators
can be defined using the new graded operators.
The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 deals
with basic facts on fuzzy preference relations. In Section 3 we present many-
valued modal logics in the more general context (over arbitrary finite bounded
commutative integral residuated lattices with constants), and the intended se-
mantics given by valued Kripke models. We close an open problem existing in
this setting, namely, whether the operations  and ✸ are interdefinable, proving
this is the case, and providing the explicit definition of each operator in terms of
the other one. This strongly simplifies the symbolic approach to the logic, since
it is only necessary axiomatize one of the modal operators to obtain a logic refer-
ring to both. In Section 4 we show how to adapt the previous general setting to
model graded preference relations: we restrict the evaluations to some arbitrary
MTL-chain B, introduce auxiliary crisp modalities b and exhibit a complete
axiomatization of a conservative extension2 of the preference logic studied in
2Namely, while the modal language used is larger, the restriction of the logic to the {,
A} fragment coincides with the original one.
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[VEG17a]. In Section 5 we study the extension of the previous logic with the
strict preference modality <, corresponding to the irreflexive restriction of the
preference relation associated to the original . We propose a complete axiom-
atization of a conservative extension of this logic (relying again in the b,
<
b
crisp modalities). In Section 6 we observe how, by the addition to the logic of
the so-called Monteiro-Baaz∆ operation, we can also provide an axiomatization
of the original logic of graded preference models pursued in [VEG17a], without
the necessity of additional modal operations. Lastly, in Section 7, we discuss
different possibilities to formalize notions of preferences on fuzzy propositions in
preference Kripke models. We finish with some conclusions and open problems.
2 Preliminaries on fuzzy preference relations
In the classical setting, a (weak) preference relation on a set of alternatives W
is usually modeled as preorder relation (i.e. a reflexive and transitive relation)
P ⊆ W ×W by interpreting (a, b) ∈ P as denoting b is at least as preferred as
a. From P one can define three disjoint relations:
• the strict preference P< = P ∩ P d,
• the indifference relation P≈ = P ∩ P t, and
• the incomparability relation P<> = P c ∩ P d.
where P d = {(a, b) : (b, a) /∈ P}, P t = {(a, b) : (b, a) ∈ P} and P c = {(a, b) :
(a, b) /∈ P}. It is clear that P< is a strict order (irreflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive), P≈ is an equivalence relation (reflexive, symmetric and transitive)
and P<> is irreflexive and symmetric. The triple (P<, P≈, P<>) is called a
preference structure,3 where the initial weak preference relation can be recovered
as P = P< ∪ P≈.
Example 2.1. Let be W = {bf, bm, cf, cm} a set of alternatives, where b
stands for beach, c for countryside, f for fish and m for meat. Assume an agent
who prefers fish to meat when going to a beach restaurant but prefers meat to fish
when going to a countryside restaurant. Moreover, she prefers having fish in a
beach restaurant to having meat in a countryside restaurant. These preferences
are modelled by the following preorder, depicted below by means of a {0, 1}-valued
relation:
P bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0 0 0
bm 1 1 1 1
cf 1 0 1 1
cm 1 0 0 1
where P (a, b) = 1 means (a, b) ∈ P , and conversely, P (a, b) = 0 means (a, b) 6∈
P .
3Although in the literature it is more common the notation (P, I, J) to denote preference
structures, with our notation we stress that the structure (P<, P≈, P<>) is generated by the
weak preference (preorder) relation P .
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In the fuzzy setting, preference relations can be attached degrees (usually
belonging to the unit interval [0, 1]) of fulfillment or strength, so they become
fuzzy relations. In this paper we will assume preference degrees are the domain
of a finite and linearly ordered scale B = (B,6, 0, 1), with 0 and 1 being its
bottom and top elements respectively. The restriction to finite linearly ordered
universes is due to technical reasons, since the axiomatization of modal logics
over infinite algebras is either open or partially solved with drawbacks concern-
ing applicability (namely, the require infinitary inference rules, see eg. [HaTe13],
[VEG17b]). Sometimes we will write also B = (B,∧,∨, 0, 1) to emphasize the
lattice operations.
In this paper, we will assume that a weak B-valued preference relation P
on a set W will be now a fuzzy ∧-preorder P : W ×W → A, where P (a, b)
is interpreted as the degree in which v is at least as preferred as u, that is,
satisfying:
• reflexivity: P (u, u) = 1 for each u ∈W
• ∧-transitivity: P (u, v) ∧ P (v, w) 6 P (u,w) for each u, v, w ∈W
Example 2.2. The following is a graded refinement of the classical preference
relation in Example 2.1. Over the same alternatives as above, now the agent
slightly prefers having meat to fish when going to a countryside restaurant, while
she strongly prefers having fish to meat when going to a beach restaurant. Also,
she usually prefers going to the beach rather than to the countryside. A possi-
ble graded modelling of these preferences can be done with the fuzzy preference
relation P :W ×W → [0, 1] defined as follows:
P bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
bm 0.8 1 0.6 0.8
cf 0.8 0.5 1 0.7
cm 0.6 0.5 0.5 1
It is easy to check that this is indeed a fuzzy ∧-preorder, where ∧ denotes the
minimum t-norm.
As in the classical case, from P it is easy to define B-valued relations corre-
sponding to graded counterparts of the strict and indifference relations associ-
ated to P :4
• First, we can define the indifference degree between two states, from the
preferential point of view, by P≈(u, v) := P (u, v) ∧ P (v, u), providing the
degree to which both u is preferred to v and, vice-versa, v is preferred to u.
This is a ∧-similarity relation, i.e. a reflexive, symmetric and ∧-transitive
B-valued relation.
4Valued-based counterparts of the indifference relation P<> have also been defined and
discussed in the literature of fuzzy preference relations (see e.g. [FR94]), but we do not go
into further details since this notion will play no role in the logic formalisms we deal with in
this paper.
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• This allows for defining a second preference relation P< corresponding to
the strict counterpart of P by, roughly speaking, “removing” the indiffer-
ent pairs of alternatives or worlds from the relation P . This amounts to
consider P< as the least B-valued relation R such that P = R∨P≈. Tak-
ing the point-wise smallest solution of this equation leads to the following
definition:
P<(u, v) :=
{
P (u, v), if P (u, v) > P (v, u),
0, otherwise.
It can be checked that if P is ∧-transitive, then so is P< (see e.g. [EGV18]),
and thus it can be considered to be a fuzzy strict order, in the sense
that the following counterpart of anti-symmetry property holds for P<: if
P<(u, v) > 0 then P<(v, u) = 0.
Example 2.3. The following are the indifference and strict preference relations
corresponding to the fuzzy preference relation in Example 2.2.
P≈ bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
bm 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
cf 0.5 0.5 1 0.5
cm 0.5 0.5 0.5 1
P< bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0 0 0
bm 0.8 1 0.6 0.8
cf 0.8 0 1 0.7
cm 0.6 0 0 1
In the next sections we will define and axiomatize a modal preference logic
where the initial preorder P together with its corresponding indifference relation
P≡ and strict preference P< can be dealt with. To do so, we need to resort the
level-cuts of the preference relations and to observe the following facts:
• Given the initial fuzzy ∧-preorder P , we can define, for each b ∈ B, its
corresponding b-cut Pb = {(u, v) : P (u, v) > b}, which is a classical pre-
order.
• Analogously, from the corresponding fuzzy strict order P<, we can also de-
fine, for each b ∈ B, the corresponding a-cut (P<)b = {(u, v) : P<(u, v) >
b} = {(u, v) : P (u, v) > b, P (u, v) > P (v, u)}. In this case, the relations
(P<)b are classical orders.
• For each level-cut relation Pb we can also define the corresponding strict
order (Pb)
<. By definition it is (Pb)
< = {(u, v) : (u, v) ∈ Pb, (v, u) 6∈
Pb} = {(u, v) : P (u, v) > b, P (v, u) < b}.
• An equivalent expression for (Pb)< is (P<)b = {(u, v) : ∃a > b, P (u, v) >
a, P (u, v) < a}.
• Finally, one can also check that (Pb)< is always included in (P<)b, i.e.
(Pb)
< ⊆ (P<)b.
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In general, (Pb)
< and (P<)b do not coincide, as the following example shows.
Example 2.4. Let B be the scale where B = {0, b, 1} and 0 < b < 1. Let
P be the B-valued preorder on the universe W = {x, y} defined by P (x, x) =
P (y, y) = P (y, x) = 1 and P (x, y) = b. Then it is obvious that,
• Pb = W ×W and thus (Pb)< = ∅
• P< is defined as, P (u, v) = 1 if u = y and v = x, and P (u, v) = 0
otherwise. Then (P<)b = {(y, x)}.
Thus (P<)b ( (Pb)
<.
As usual, one can recover the fuzzy relations P and P< from their crisp
level-cut relations:
P (u, v) = max{b∧Pb(u, v) : b ∈ B}, P
<(u, v) = max{b∧ (P<)b(u, v) : b ∈ B}
Moreover, even if the relations (P<)b and (Pb)
< do not generally coincide, P<
can also be recovered from the crisp relations {(Pb)< : b ∈ B}.
Proposition 2.5. Let P be an B-valued ∧-preorder on a universe W . Then
for all u, v ∈W ,
P<(u, v) = max{b ∧ (P<)b(u, v) : b ∈ B} = max{b ∧ (Pb)<(u, v) : b ∈ B}
Proof. Observe that:
• If P<(u, v) = 0 then it is easy to check that (P<)b(u, v) = (Pb)<(u, v) = 0
for all b ∈ A.
• If P<(u, v) 6= 0, then P<(u, v) = P (u, v) > P (v, x). Then:
– For a = P (u, v), it is obvious that (P<)a(u, v) = 1 and (P
<)b(u, v) =
0 for all b > a.
– By definition, for a = P (u, v) we have Pa(u, v) = 1 and Pa(v, u) = 0.
Then (Pa)
<(u, v) = 1 and it is also obvious that (Pb)
<(u, v) = 0 for
all b > a.
Thus the claim is proved.
3 Many-valued modal logics: language and se-
mantics
A suitable formalism over which we can construct a graded preference framework
is that of many-valued modal logics. In particular, we take as starting point the
modal logic introduced in [BEGR11] and further studied in [VEG17a]: finitely-
valued (propositional) fuzzy logics enriched with modal-like operations.
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Let us begin by defining the formal language of our underlying many-valued
propositional setting. Let B = (B,∧,∨,⊙,→, 0, 1) be a finite (bounded, in-
tegral, commutative) residuated lattice [GJKO07], and consider its canonical
expansion Bc by adding a new constant a for every element b ∈ B (canonical
in the sense that the interpretation of b in Bc is b itself). A negation operation
¬ can always be defined as ¬x = x→ 0.
The logic associated with Bc will be denoted by Λ(Bc), and the set Fm
of propositional formulas of its language is defined in the usual way from a set
of propositional variables V in the language of residuated lattices (we will use
the same symbol to denote connectives and operations), including constants
{b : b ∈ B}. The corresponding logical consequence relation |=Bc is defined as
follows: for any set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm,
• Γ |=Bc ϕ if, and only if,
∀h ∈ Hom(Fm,Bc), if h[Γ ] ⊆ {1} then h(φ) = 1,
where Hom(Fm,Bc) denotes the set of evaluations (homomorphisms) of formu-
las on Bc.
Lifting to the modal level, we can expand the propositional language Fm by
modal operators in different ways. The most general way to do so is consider a
pair of unary operators ,✸, and build the corresponding set KFm of modal
formulas, again defined as usual from a set V of propositional variables, resid-
uated lattice operations {∧,∨,⊙,→}, truth constants {b : b ∈ B}, and modal
operators {,✸}.
We are now ready to introduce B-valued Kripke models, a generalization to
B of classical Kripke models.
Definition 3.1. A B-model is a triple M = 〈W,P, e〉 such that
• W is a set of worlds,
• P : W ×W → B is a B-valued binary relation between worlds, and
• e : W × V → B is a world-wise B-evaluation of variables.
The evaluation e is uniquely extended to formulas of KFm by using the
operations in B for what concerns propositional connectives, and letting
e(v,ϕ) =
∧
w∈W
{P (v, w)→ e(w,ϕ)}
e(v,✸ϕ) =
∨
w∈W
{P (v, w)⊙ e(w,ϕ)}
We will denote by KB the class of all B-models. Given an B-model M ∈ KB
and Γ ∪{ϕ} ⊆MFm, we write Γ M ϕ whenever for any v ∈W , if e(v, γ) = 1
for all γ ∈ Γ , then e(v, ϕ) = 1 too. Analogously, for C ⊆ KB, we write Γ C ϕ
whenever Γ M ϕ for any M ∈ C.
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In [BEGR11], the - fragment of the previous logic was axiomatized, but
it was left as an open question how to axiomatize the logic with both  and
✸ operations. That question was addressed in [VEG17a], where an axiomatic
system was proposed and proved complete. Nevertheless, we propose below a
new solution to the problem, that also closes an open question: namely, that of
the inter-definability of the modal operators in the above valued setting. While
it is well known that in classical modal logic both modal operators are inter
definable (ϕ = ¬✸¬ϕ and ✸ϕ = ¬¬ϕ), it was not known if something
similar happened in valued cases. In particular, since the negation might fail to
be involutive (for instance, it is involutive in  Lukasiewicz logic, but not in other
well-known fuzzy logics), the classical interdefinition fails.
Nevertheless, we can prove different equalities, that will serve us to work
with the axiomatic systems presented in [BEGR11] plus a simple definition of
the dual operation.
Given two formulas ϕ, ψ, we will write ϕ ≡KB ψ if and only if for any B-
model M and any v ∈W it holds e(v, ϕ) = e(v, ψ).
Lemma 3.2. Let B be a finite (bounded, integral, commutative) residuated
lattice. Then for any b ∈ B it holds
b =
∧
a∈B
(b→ a)→ a
Proof. On the one hand, by residuation, b 6 (b → a) → a for each a, since
b 6 (b→ a)→ a iff b⊙ (b→ a) 6 a, which is always true. Thus, b 6
∧
a∈B(b→
a)→ a.
On the other hand, (b→ b)→ b = b, so
∧
a∈B(b→ a)→ a 6 b.
Proposition 3.3 (Interdefinability). Let B be a finite (bounded, integral, com-
mutative) residuated lattice. Then, the following equalities hold:
ϕ ≡KB
∧
b∈B
(✸(ϕ→ b)→ b)
✸ϕ ≡KB
∧
b∈B
((ϕ→ b)→ b)
Proof. Is easy to prove that for any B, the following equalities hold:
− (
∧
i∈I
χi) ≡KB
∧
i∈I
χi, for I being a finite set of indexes
− (ϕ→ c) ≡KB ✸ϕ→ c, for any constant c
The first one follows from the definition of the evaluation of  as a conjunction.
The second one follows from a general property of any residuated lattice (see
eg. [JipTsi02]), that states that for any set X of elements of the universe and
any other element y ∧
x∈X
(x→ y) =
∨
x∈X
x→ y.
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Concerning the definition of  from ✸, the previous properties imply that,
for any B,∧
b∈B
(✸(ϕ→ b)→ b) ≡KB
∧
b∈B
((ϕ→ b)→ b) ≡KB (
∧
b∈B
((ϕ→ b)→ b))
From Lemma 3.2, we also know that ϕ ≡KB
∧
b∈B((ϕ→ b)→ b), so the two
formulas evaluate equally in any world of any model. Thus, in particular, for
any B-model, and any v ∈W , we can conclude
e(v,
∧
b∈B
(✸(ϕ→ b)→ b)) =
∧
w∈W
P (v, w) → e(w,
∧
b∈B
((ϕ→ b)→ b))
=
∧
w∈W
P (v, w) → e(w,ϕ)
= e(v,ϕ).
For what concerns the definability of ✸ from , we can use Lemma 3.2 again
to get that
✸ϕ ≡KB
∧
b∈B
((✸ϕ→ b)→ b).
From the second property of B-models above, we can conclude
✸ϕ ≡KB
∧
b∈B
((ϕ→ b)→ b).
After the previous results, it turns out that an axiomatic system addressing
both  and ✸ operators with their intended semantics for KB can be easily
given by adding to the logic Λ(Fr,Bc) presented in [BEGR11] the abbreviation
✸ϕ :=
∧
b∈B
((ϕ→ b)→ b).
We will denote this axiomatic system by MB. See Appendix A for the details
on its definition.
4 Multi-modal preference logic
Using the previously defined general modal setting, our objective is formalizing
a framework to account for graded preferences in the sense of Section 2. Thus,
several particularities arise in respect to the previous general case. To do so,
first of all we have to require the accessibility relations R in B-models be ∧-
transitive and reflexive, to capture the transitive and reflexive properties of
(weak) preference relations. Also, in order to represent preferences between
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propositions (as opposed to between alternatives), for instance in the style of
von Wright’s treatment of preferences [vW63], it is necessary to introduce in the
language modalities A and E corresponding to the universal relation W ×W .
This is due to the fact that the most common extensions of preference relations
on worlds to preference relations on propositions refer to global conditions, i.e.
they express a condition to be satisfied by either at least in one world or in all
the worlds of the model, see Section 7 for more details.
While the restriction to transitive and reflexive models can be dealt with
in a systematic way, additional operations to refer to the universal modality A
(and its dual E, obtained by identifying A with  in Proposition 3.3) require,
for technical reasons, to unfold the modality  in a family of cut-modalities
{b : b ∈ B}. Moreover, we also need to restrict the kind of propositional
algebras of evaluation to linearly ordered ones. Thus, from this point on, we
assume
B to be a linearly ordered finite (integral, commutative) residuated lattice,
or equivalently, to be a finite MTL-chain.These modifications are due to tech-
nical reasons in the completeness proof, resulting from the difficulties posed to
axiomatize many-valued modal logics with a crisp accessibility relation (neces-
sary in order to get the desired A modality) over non-linearly ordered algebras.
Thus, let us define by MFm the set of multi-modal formulas, again defined
as usual from a set V of propositional variables, (binary) residuated lattice
connectives {∧,∨,⊙,→ }, truth constant symbols {a : b ∈ B} and the family
of unary modalities symbols {b : b ∈ B}.
We are now ready to introduce B-valued preference Kripke models.
Definition 4.1. A B-preference model is a triple M = 〈W,P, e〉 such that
• W is a set of worlds,
• P : W×W → B is a B-valued ∧-pre-order, i.e. a reflexive and ∧-transitive
B-valued binary relation between worlds, and
• e : W × V → B is a world-wise B-evaluation of variables.
The evaluation e is uniquely extended to formulas of MFm by using the
operations in B for what concerns propositional connectives, and letting
for each b ∈ B,
e(v,abϕ) =
∧
w:P (v,w)>b
{e(w,ϕ)}
Sometimes we will also write v b w for P (v, w) > b, or even for Pb(v, w).
We will denote by PB the class of B-preference models. Given an B-
preference model M ∈ PB and Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ MFm, we write Γ M ϕ whenever
for any v ∈ W , if e(v, γ) = 1 for all γ ∈ Γ , then e(v, ϕ) = 1 too. Analogously,
we write Γ PB ϕ whenever Γ M ϕ for any M ∈ PB.
We will give differentiated symbols to some particular definable modal op-
erators that enjoy a special meaning in our models. Namely:
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• Aϕ := 0ϕ and Eϕ := ✸0ϕ.
These operators are in fact universal necessity and possibility modal op-
erators respectively, i.e.,
e(v,Aϕ) =
∧
w∈W
{e(w,ϕ)}, e(v,Eϕ) =
∨
w∈W
{e(w,ϕ)}.
• ✸bϕ :=
∧
a∈B(b(ϕ→ a)→ a)
Simple computations show that, as expected (from Proposition 3.3),
e(v,✸bϕ) =
∨
w:P (v,w)>b
{e(w,ϕ)}.
• ϕ :=
∧
b∈B b→ bϕ and ✸ϕ :=
∨
b∈B b⊙✸bϕ.
It is easy to check that the evaluation of these operators in a preference
model as defined here, coincides with the usual one for fuzzy Kripke mod-
els, i.e.,
e(v,ϕ) =
∧
w∈W
{P (v, w)→ e(w,ϕ)}, e(v,✸ϕ) =
∨
w∈W
{P (v, w)⊙e(w,ϕ)}
Regarding the intuitive meaning of modal formulas of the form ✸ϕ and ϕ,
let us first consider the case ϕ is a crisp formula. Then the value of a formula
✸ϕ in a world/alternative v ∈ W of the above preference model
e(v,✸ϕ) =
∨
w∈W,e(w,ϕ)=1
{P (v, w)}
is the maximum degree in which some alternative where ϕ holds is preferred to
v. Similarly, a formula ϕ is evaluated to
e(v,ϕ) =
∧
w∈W,e(w,ϕ)=1
{P (v, w)},
the minimum of the degrees in which all alternatives where ϕ is true are preferred
to v. These generalize the semantics of classical preference operators, where ϕ
is true in a world if in all preferred alternatives ϕ holds, and ✸ϕ is true in a
world if there is a preferred alternative where ϕ holds.
In the full general case, where formulas ϕ are also valued on arbitrary values
of the algebra B, the values of modal formulas ✸ϕ and ϕ take into account
both preference degrees and the values of the formula ϕ at each alternative.
In particular the value P (v, w) ⊙ e(w,ϕ) stands for the truth-evaluation of the
conjunctive statement “w is preferred to v and ϕ is true at w”, while P (v, w)→
e(w,ϕ) stands for the truth-evaluation of the implicative statement “if w is
preferred to v then ϕ is true at w”.
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Example 4.2. Let B = {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1} and let B = (B,min,max,⊙,→, 0, 1)
be the MV-chain over B with the standard  Lukasiewicz operations x ⊙ y =
max(x+ y− 1, 0) and x→ y = min(1− x+ y, 1). Let us consider a multi-modal
language MFm built from the set of propositional variables V = {c, b, f,m}
(standing for “countryside”, “beach”, “fish” and “meat” respectively) and truth-
constants r for each r ∈ B.
The preference relation P from Example 2.2 can be used to define an B-
preference model M = (W,P, e), with W = {cf,cm,bf,bm}, P defined as in
Example 2.2, and where the evaluation e : W × V → B interprets the proposi-
tional variables {c, b, f,m} to their intended crisp values, that is, for x ∈ {c,b}
and y ∈ {f,m} we have:
e(xy, c) =
{
1, if x = c,
0, otherwise
e(xy, b) =
{
1, if x = b,
0, otherwise
and similarly for the variables f and m.
To see how the the model M can be used to evaluate other (fuzzy) propositions
taking advantage of the rich algebraic setting, we can consider the propositions
“light meal”, denoted l, and “heavy meal”, denoted h, defined as the following
compound formulas:
l := (0.8 ∧ f) ∨ (0.2 ∧m)
h := (0.7 ∧m) ∨ (0.3 ∧ f)
leading to the following evaluation of these formulas in the four possible worlds
of the model:
e(·, ·) l h
bf 0.8 0.3
bm 0.2 0.7
cf 0.8 0.3
cm 0.2 0.7
Further, one can compute in M, for instance, the degrees to which the modal
formulas ✸l and ✸h hold true in each of the possible worlds of the model. We
exemplify below the computations of these values as max−⊙ compositions (de-
noted ◦) of the graded preference relation P (represented as a matrix) with the
evaluations e(·, l) and e(·, h) (represented as vectors):
• e(v,✸l) =
∨
w∈W P (v, w) ⊙ e(w, l)
P bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
bm 0.8 1 0.6 0.8
cf 0.8 0.5 1 0.7
cm 0.6 0.5 0.5 1
◦
e l
bf 0.8
bm 0.2
cf 0.8
cm 0.2
=
e ✸l
bf 0.8
bm 0.6
cf 0.6
cm 0.4
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• e(v,✸h) =
∨
w∈W P (v, w)⊙ e(w, h)
P bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
bm 0.8 1 0.6 0.8
cf 0.8 0.5 1 0.7
cm 0.6 0.5 0.5 1
◦
e h
bf 0.3
bm 0.7
cf 0.3
cm 0.7
=
e ✸h
bf 0.3
bm 0.7
cf 0.4
cm 0.7
4.1 Axiomatizing fuzzy (weak) preference models
In this section we axiomatize the logic whose semantics is given by the class PB
of B-preference models, and based on the use of the graded modalities b (and
in some cases, also the abbreviation ✸b), with b ∈ B, introduced above. We will
denote by B+ the set of positive elements of B, namely, B \ {0}.
Definition 4.3. We define the fuzzy multi-modal logic mMB by the following
axioms and rules:
• Logic CMB (Appendix A) for each b with b ∈ B. (This is the axiomatic
system of the minimal modal logic over crisp B-models ([BEGR11], see
Appendix A for details).
• For each a, b ∈ B such that a 6 b, nestedness axioms
aϕ→ bϕ
• For each a, b ∈ B, reflexivity and transitivity axioms, namely
Ta : aϕ→ ϕ, 4a,b : a∧bϕ→ abϕ
• Symmetry axiom for 0, namely B0 : ϕ→ 0✸0ϕ;
• Modus Ponens rule and the necessitation rule for each b ∈ B,5 namely
Nb : from ϕ derive bϕ.
It will be also useful later to consider the system mM−
B+
obtained from mMB by
dropping the following axioms:
• the reflexivity axioms Tb, for b ∈ B,
• any axiom involving the subindex 0 (an element not in B+).
Note that, for b > 0, b (and so✸b) are graded counterparts of S4 modalities,
while 0 (and so ✸0) is an S5 modality, see e.g. [HC72] for a monograph on
classical modal logics and their main kinds of modalities.
Let ⊢mMB be the notion of proof for the previous axiomatic system, defined
as usual. We can now show that it is indeed complete with respect to our
intended semantics given by the class of preference structures PB .
5Observe that in KB , due to the inclusion axioms, the necessitation rules for b for a ∈ B
+
are derivable from the one for 0.
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Theorem 4.4. For any Γ, ϕ ⊆MFm,
Γ ⊢mMB ϕ if and only if Γ PB ϕ.
Proof. Soundness (left to right direction) is easy to check. For what concerns
completeness (right to left direction), we can define a canonical model as in
[BEGR11], Mc = (W c, {P cb }b∈B, e
c) with a set of crisp accessibility relations as
follows, where Th(mMB) = {ϕ : ⊢mMB ϕ} denotes the set of theorems of mMB:
• W c = {v ∈ Hom(MFm,B) : v(Th(mMB)) = {1}},
• P cb (v, w) if and only if v(bϕ) = 1⇒ w(ϕ) = 1 for all ϕ ∈MFm,
• ec(v, p) = v(p), for any propositional variable p.
To proceed with the completeness proof, it is necessary to prove the so-called
Truth Lemma, which states that the evaluation of modal formulas in the model
is compatible with the intended semantics. Namely, we have to show that
ec(v,bϕ) = v(bϕ)
for any ϕ and any b ∈ B. This is proven in [BEGR11], see Appendix A for
details.
Next we show that the set {P cb : b ∈ B} is a nested set of reflexive and
transitive relations. That P cb ⊆ P
c
a if a 6 b directly follows from the nestedness
axioms, and that each relation P cb is reflexive and transitive follows from axioms
Tb and 4a,b.
Now, from the (crisp) relations {P cb : b ∈ A}, let us define the fuzzy relation
P c as follows:
P c(v, w) = max{b ∈ B : P cb (v, w)}.
It is clear that P c(w, v) > b if and only if P cb (v, w). Then, the Truth Lemma
for the previous Canonical Model immediately implies
ec(v,bϕ) =
∧
w∈W c,P c(v,w)>b
w(ϕ),
It follows from axioms Tb that each P
c
b is reflexive, and so, P
c is a reflexive
relation as well. Moreover, from axioms 4a,b, we get that P
c is ∧-transitive.
The structure (W c, P c, ec) is almost an B-preference model: P c0 might be a
proper subset of W c×W c, and not the universal relation. Indeed, observe that,
thanks to axioms T0, 40,0 and B0, P
c
0 can be proven to be an equivalence relation,
even though it is not necessarily the case that P c0 =W
c ×W c. Hence, the only
remaining step is to show that we can obtain an equivalent model (in the sense
of preserving the truth-values of formulas) in which P c0 is the universal relation,
and thus to really get that 0 and ✸0 are universal modalities. Nevertheless,
since P cb ⊆ P
c
0 for all b ∈ B, for any v ∈ W
c we can define a restricted model
Mcv = (W
c
v , P
c
v , e
c
v) where W
c
v = {u ∈ W
c : P c0 (v, u)}, P
c
v is the restriction of P
c
to W cv ×W
c
v , and, for any u ∈W
c
v and any formula ϕ ∈MFm,
ecv(u, ϕ) = e
c(u, ϕ).
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Now, this model Mcv is indeed a B-preference model and thus it belongs to the
class PB.
To conclude the proof, observe that, if Γ 6⊢mMB ϕ, then there is v ∈ W
c
such that v([Γ ]) ⊆ {1} and v(ϕ) < 1 (because the modal inference rules affect
only theorems of the logic). Then, all the previous considerations allow us to
prove that, in the model Mcv, we have e
c
v(v, [Γ ]) ⊆ 1 and e
c
v(v, ϕ) < 1. Hence,
Γ 6Mc
v
ϕ and thus Γ 6PB ϕ as well, and this concludes the completeness proof.
5 Adding strict preferences
As it has been mentioned before, in order to provide a framework allowing a
finer handling of preference relations, it would be desirable to have a richer
language able to also represent strict preference relations between states.
Within the setting developed in the previous sections, this amounts to con-
sider in the language new modalities and in the models, besides B-valued (weak)
preference relations on worlds, their strict counterpart. Namely, given an B-
preference model 〈W,P, e〉, recall the relation P< : W ×W → B, the fuzzy strict
counterpart of P defined
in Section 2:
P<(v, u) :=
{
P (v, u) if P (v, u) > P (u, v),
0 otherwise.
Then, a richer set of formulas, including (fuzzy) modalities for strict preferences
<,✸<, can be evaluated in a B-preference model 〈W,P, e〉 relying on the strict
preference relation P<, as it was done for ,✸ formulas over B-preference
models, namely:
e(v,<ϕ) =
∧
w∈W
P<(v, w) → e(w,ϕ), and e(v,✸<ϕ) =
∨
w∈W
P<(v, w)⊙e(w,ϕ)
As in Proposition 3.3, < and ✸< are inter-definable, so we will mainly
work with the  modalities, and use the abbreviation
✸
<ϕ :=
∧
b∈B
(<(ϕ→ b)→ b)
In the previous section, we relied on the level-cut relations Pb, the S4 modal-
ities b and the universal modality 0 to get an indirect axiomatization (the
logic mMB) of the graded preference modality  and the universal preference A.
We follow a similar approach in this section and consider cut strict modalities
<b for b > 0. These modalities are to be interpreted by transitive and irreflexive
relations. However, the addition to the system mMB of these modalities in such
a way that the new system keeps being complete with respect to the intended
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semantics (that is, models where the relations that evaluate the strict modali-
ties are irreflexive counterparts of the relations that evaluate the S4 modalities)
is not immediate. Indeed, it is well known that an irreflexive modality cannot
be axiomatized by a usual axiom or rule schemata (meaning that there is not
an axiom or rule closed under arbitrary substitutions that exactly characterizes
the irreflexive models) [BdRV01]. Thus, more involved techniques have been
developed for this purpose [Seg71, Gab81]. We will resort here to the bulldozing
construction that, in the classical setting, transforms a reflexive and transitive
model into a irreflexive and transitive one with an equivalent logical behavior.
We will see in Section 5.3 and in Appendix B how this classical construction
keeps working in the finite-valued case.
Nevertheless, the full proof of completeness does not directly follow from the
one done for the classical case [vBGR09]): although the level-cut accessibility
relations are crisp, the values of the formulas at each world are many-valued,
posing additional problems to solve.
5.1 Language and semantics
Let PFm be the expanded set of graded preference formulas
defined as usual from a set V of propositional variables, residuated lattice
operations {∧,∨,⊙,→ }, truth constants {b : b ∈ B}, plus modal operators
{b : b ∈ B} and {
<
b : b ∈ B
+}.
The interpretation of the b modalities will be exactly the same as in Section
4, that is, given a an B-preference model M = 〈W,P, e〉, we let
e(v,bϕ) =
∧
w:P (v,w)>b
e(w,ϕ),
Regarding the new modalities, a first decision that must be taken is choosing
the evaluation of the <b modalities.
As discussed in Section 4, there are two possible ways to approach the defi-
nition of the strict relations starting from the original fuzzy relation P : either
with the (Pb)
<’s, the strict versions of the b-cuts of P , or with the (P<)b’s, the
b-cuts of the strict version of P . As it is shown in Prop. 2.5, the original P< can
be recovered from both families, which allows to define <,✸< using either of
the two semantics for <b ,✸
<
b (see Lemma 5.1 below). We will present in this
section an axiomatization of the logic using the family of crisp relations (Pb)
<
for each b ∈ B+.
Therefore, given the model M = 〈W,P, e〉, we define
e(v,<b ϕ) =
∧
w:v≺bw
e(w,ϕ)
where, for any v, w ∈ W and a ∈ B+, v ≺b w stands for (Pb)<(v, w), that is,
P (v, w) > b and P (w, v) < b. In terms of the notation b introduced from
Definition 4.1, this is equivalent to say that v ≺b w if and only if v b w and
w 6b v.
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We will keep denoting by PB the logical consequence relation over the
extended language PFm, defined exactly as done for MFm in Section 4.
As it happened in the previous section, the graded modality <, and the
corresponding ✸<b with the intended meaning can be defined from the new set
of operations. Namely, we consider the following abbreviations in our language:
• ✸<b ϕ :=
∧
b∈B(
<
b (ϕ→ b)→ b);
• <ϕ :=
∧
b∈B b→ 
<
b ϕ.
It follows from Proposition 3.3 that, under the above definition, in any pref-
erence model we get e(v,✸<b ϕ) =
∨
w:v≺aw
e(w,ϕ).
On the other hand, next lemma shows that the definition of < in the above
terms is accordance with the intended meaning stated at the beginning of this
section.
Lemma 5.1. For any B-preference model M and v ∈W , it holds
e(v,<ϕ) =
∧
w∈W
P<(v, w) → e(w,ϕ).
Proof.
∧
w∈W P
<(v, w) → e(w,ϕ) =
∧
w∈W
∨
b∈B+
{b : P<b (v, w)} → e(w,ϕ) from
Proposition 2.5. This equals
∧
w∈W
∨
b∈B+
b · (v ≺b w) → e(w,ϕ) understanding
≺b as a {0, 1}-valued relation. By properties of residuated lattices, the previous
coincides with
∧
w∈W
∧
b∈B+
(b → ((v ≺b w) → e(w,ϕ))). Since the infima are
independent, we can swap them and get the independent element out of the
interior one to get
∧
b∈B+
(b →
∧
w∈W ((v ≺b w) → e(w,ϕ))) which is exactly∧
b∈B+
(b→ e(v,<b ϕ)).
5.2 Axiomatization
In this section we axiomatize PB over PFm using the systems introduced in
Definition
4.3. Note that, as we commented above, the modalities <0 and ✸
<
0 will be
omitted, and that is the reason behind removing in the previous definition all
axioms concerning the value 0.
Definition 5.2. We define the fuzzy preference logic PB by the following axioms
and rules:
• System mMB from Definition 4.3 for the modalities b, with b ∈ B;
• System mM−
B+
from Definition 4.3 for the modalities <b with b ∈ B
+ =
B r {0};
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• For each b ∈ B+, Inclusion axioms bϕ→ 
<
b ϕ;
• For each a, b ∈ B+ such that b 6 a, Interaction 1 and 2 axioms:
(I1) <b ϕ→ a
<
b ϕ
(I2) <b ϕ→ b
<
aϕ
• For each b ∈ B+ and a ∈ B, Interaction 3 axiom:
(I3) <b ϕ ∧ (ψ → a)→ b(ϕ ∨ (bψ → a))
Soundness of PB with respect to the intended semantics PB is not hard to
check. The inclusion axioms follow immediately from the fact that ≺b ⊆ b.
Let us show soundness of the other axioms.
Lemma 5.3. Interaction 1 and 2 axioms are valid in PB .
Proof. Assume b 6 a ∈ B+, and consider any B-preference model M, and any
v, w, u ∈W . Assume v a w and w b u. From ∧-transitivity of  we get that
v a∧b u, and since b 6 a, v b u
If moreover it holds that w ≺b u, by definition it means that P (u,w) < b 6 a.
Using reflexivity and ∧−transitivity of P it follows that P (u, v) ∧ P (v, w) 6
P (u,w) < b. Since P (v, w) > a > b, necessarily P (u, v) < b, so by defini-
tion, v ≺b u. This proves the Interaction 1 cases. The proof of soundness of
Interaction 2 is analogous.
Lemma 5.4. Interaction 3 axiom is valid in PB .
Proof. Consider a preference model M, and any v ∈ W . By definition,
e(v,b(ϕ ∨ (bψ → c))) =
∧
w:vbw
e(w, (ϕ ∨ (bψ → c))) This infimum can
be naturally divided in∧
w:v≺bw
e(w, (ϕ ∨ (bψ → c))) ∧
∧
w:vbw,wbv
e(w, (ϕ ∨ (bψ → c))).
Concerning the first expression, by monotonicity it is greater or equal than∧
w:v≺bw
e(w,ϕ) = e(v,<b ϕ).
Similarly, the second expression is greater or equal than∧
w:vbw,wbv
e(w,bψ → c). By using the definition and applying some
lattice basic results, we get the following chain of (in)equalities:∧
w:vbw,wbv
e(w,bψ → c) =
∧
w:vbw,wbv
((
∧
u:wbu
e(u, ψ))→ c)
=
∧
w:vbw,wbv
(
∨
u:wbu
e(u, ψ)→ c)
>
∧
w:vbw,wbv
e(v, ψ)→ c
= e(v, ψ → c).
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Then, e(v,b(ϕ ∨ (bψ → c))) > e(v,
<
b ϕ) ∧ e(v, ψ → c), proving the lemma.
5.3 Completeness
To prove completeness of PB with respect to PB , we define the canonical model
putting together the two sets of modalities in a similar way as it was done for only
b,✸b in Section 4.1. That is to say, we let M
c = (W c, {Pb : b ∈ B}, {P
<
b :>
b ∈ B+}, e) be the model6 defined by:
• W c := {h ∈ Hom(PFm,B) : h(Th(PB))},
• P cb (v, w) iff v(bϕ) = 1⇒ w(ϕ) = 1, for each b ∈ B,
• P c<b (v, w) iff v(
<
b ϕ) = 1⇒ w(ϕ) = 1, for each b ∈ B
+,
• ec(v, p) = v(p) for all propositional variable p.
Recall that it can be easily proven that P cb (v, w) if and only if v(bϕ) 6 w(ϕ)
and v(✸6b ϕ) > w(ϕ), and the analogous holds for P
c<
b (v, w).
It is our objective to prove both, the Truth Lemma (i.e., that ec(v, ϕ) = v(ϕ)
for any formula ϕ in PFm), and to see that the evaluation on the previous model
coincides with that over the corresponding cut B-preference model (i.e., only
with Pb).
The same proof developed in the previous section for the completeness of
mMB (Theorem 4.4) shows the Truth Lemma (for both sets of modalities b
and <b ).
Inclusion and nestedness axioms imply that P c<b (v, w) ⊆ P
c
b (v, w) ⊆ P
c
0 for
each b ∈ B. Then, as it was done in mMB, we can restrict M
c in such a way
that P c0 is the universal relation, and so get that 0 (and ✸0) are universal
modalities.
Then, to prove completeness, for a given v ∈ Mc, we need to provide an
B-preference model equivalent to Mc at v. This amounts to transform the
canonical model to an equivalent one, in which the following conditions are
equivalent:
C1 P c<b (v, w)
C2 a) P cb (v, w),
b) not P cb (w, v).
It is easy to see that in the original canonical model, C1 implies C2-a thanks
to the inclusion axiom. Let us further see how C2 implies C1. While in the
classical approach this can be done by directly relying on Sahlqvist theory (see
[vBGR09, Fact 4.]), for the many-valued case such theory has still to be devel-
oped and we need to do some calculations.
6In order to lighten the notation we omit the subscript c in the elements of the canonical
model.
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Lemma 5.5. In the canonical model, C2 implies C1 for any v, w ∈W .
Proof. Assume P cb (v, w) and not P
c
b (w, v). Condition C2 implies, by definition,
that there is some formula ψ such that w(bψ) = 1 and v(ψ) = α < 1. Consider
now any formula ϕ such that v(<b ϕ) = 1, and it is our goal to see that w(ϕ) = 1
too.
Observe that in the previous situation, v(<b ϕ ∧ (ψ → α)) = 1. Then, by
Interaction 3 axiom, we get that v(b(ϕ ∨ (bψ → α))) = 1 too. Since we
assumed that Pb(v, w), this implies that w(ϕ ∨ (bψ → α)) = 1. But we know
that w(bψ) = 1, so w(bψ → α) = α < 1. Since B is linearly ordered, this
implies that necessarily w(ϕ) = 1.
To proceed, we need to check that C1 implies C2-b, which is a certain ir-
reflexivity condition. To do so, we will use the bulldozing method to transform
the canonical model to an irreflexive one while maintaining its behavior in all
other aspects relevant to the proof. The proof is similar to the classical one, but
taking into account several accessibility relations at once and the order between
them (namely, P ca ⊆ P
c
b for all b 6 a).
It is worth to point out that in order to be able to proceed with the bulldozing
construction, the ∧-transitivity of P in the preference models plays a crucial role,
since it is then the case that in our intended models, not only Pb are transitive,
but also P<b . The soundness of this property is necessary in order to successfully
unravel the canonical model to an irreflexive one, as we will see below.
It is not only the case that the P c<b ’s are ∧-transitive, but also some other
properties for them can be proven before proceeding. Namely, observe that after
applying the necessitation rule, axiom K and Interaction 2 axiom, we get that
the formula b
<
b ϕ → b
<
b bϕ is a theorem of in PB. Then, by Interaction
1, we get that
<b ϕ→ b
<
b bϕ (1)
is a theorem of PB as well.
For each element b ∈ B+, we can see the restriction of the canonical model
to P cb as a set of P
c
b -clusters, namely maximal sets C
b of elements from W c
with respect to P cb ∪ (P
c
b )
−1, i.e., such that for any v, w ∈ Cb, both P cb (v, w)
and P cb (w, v). Any failure of condition C1 implying C2-a (i.e, elements in the
canonical model for which both P c<b (v, w) and P
c
b (w, v)) implies, by Inclusion
axioms, that this happens inside some P cb -cluster. The following shows that
this failure happens in fact inside P<b -clusters. The latter, analogously to P
c
b -
clusters, are maximal sets of elements from W c with respect to P c<b ∪ (P
c<
b )
−1.
Lemma 5.6. (c.f. [vBGR09, Lemma 1]) Let Cb be a P cb -cluster in M
c. If
P c<b (v, w) for some worlds v, w ∈ C
b, then P c<b (s, t) as well for all s, t ∈ C
b.
Proof. Take any s ∈ Cb, and any formula ϕ such that s(<b ϕ) = 1. Then,
since the above formula (1) is a theorem in PB, we have s(bb
<
bϕ) = 1 as
well. Now, since s, v ∈ Cb we know P cb (s, v), so v(b
<
aϕ) = 1 by definition
of Pa. By assumption, P
c<
b (v, w), so w(bϕ) = 1, again by definition of P
c<
b .
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Finally, given that P cb (w, t) (since both worlds belong to the cluster C
b), we get
t(ϕ) = 1, proving P c<b (s, t).
In order to avoid these situations, i.e. loops of the form
[P c<b (w, u1), P
c<
b (u1, u2), . . . , P
c<
b (un, w)], the bulldozing construction cre-
ates Z copies of each world in a P c<b -cluster, and then orders them strictly,
mimicking the original behavior of the cluster but effectively removing any
reflexivity over P c<b .
The construction of the bulldozed model is done in a similar way to
[vBGR09]. The only relevant difference is, when ordering the new created
worlds, to choose an ordering that takes into account the possible interactions
of strict clusters for different level-cuts. This can be achieved thanks to the
∧-transitivity of the P c<b ’s. We include in Appendix B the technical details of
the construction and the correctness of the bulldozed model.
All the previous considerations allow us to state the desired completeness of
B-valued preference logic PB with respect to the intended semantics.
Theorem 5.7 (Completeness of PB). For any set of formulas Γ ∪{ϕ} ⊆ PFm,
Γ ⊢PB ϕ if and only if Γ PB ϕ.
Proof. Soundness was proven in Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4. As for completeness, if
Γ 6⊢PB ϕ, we know (see details in Appendix B) we can transform the canonical
model Mc = (W c, {P cb : b ∈ B}, {P
c<
b : b ∈ B
+}, ec) into a new model N =
〈N, {Sb}b∈B, {S
<
b }b∈B+ , f〉 such that
• 〈N, {Sb}b∈B, f〉 is a preference model,
• For each b ∈ B+ and v, w ∈ N it holds S<b (v, w) if and only if Sb(v, w)
and not Sb(w, v).
• There is v ∈ B such that f(v, Γ ) ⊆ {1} and f(v, ϕ) < 1.
This proves the theorem.
6 Back to fuzzy modalities
In the previous section, we have provided a complete axiomatic system PB for
the graded preference modalities b’s, 
<
b ’s (and the definable ✸b’s and ✸
<
b ’s).
Before, in Section 4 we have seen that the original fuzzy modalities  and <
can be expressed from them. Thus, the system PB can be considered as an
axiomatization of the modalities , < and A (defining also ✸,✸< and E) in
an extended language.
In this section, we will explore a way of getting the same logic for the graded
modalities ,<, A modalities, without relying on the cut modalities. a,
<
b .
This can be achieved by extending the original language with only one addi-
tional operation (instead of |B| modal operations), which is particularly relevant
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in possible future works studying cases with infinite algebra of evaluation B (be-
cause in such a way, the language would still be kept finite, in contrast with the
language arising from the cut modalities).
In order to obtain an axiomatization of the modal logic without the ad-
dition of cut modalities, it is possible to generalize an approach introduced in
[BEGR09] that allows us to remove them as primitive operators in the language.
Indeed, if we enrich our language with the well-known Monteiro-Baaz ∆
connective (see e.g. [Ha´j98]), the graded modalities b and 
<
b turn to be
expressible in terms of the original modal operators  and <. In fact, the
most natural definition is based on the corresponding ✸-operations, themselves
definable from their respective -ones (Proposition 3.3).
Recall that the Monteiro-Baaz ∆ operation over a linearly ordered MTL-
chain B is the operation defined as
∆(b) =
{
1 if b = 1
0 otherwise
for all b ∈ B. In the following, we denote by ϕ ≈ b the formula ∆(ϕ↔ b).
Lemma 6.1. For any formula ψ, the following equalities hold:
bϕ ≡PB
∧
a∈B
(∆(b→ ✸(ϕ ≈ a))→ a)
<b ϕ ≡PB
∧
a∈B
(∆(b→ ✸<(ϕ ≈ a))→ a)
Proof. Let M be a B-preference model. We will do the details for the first case,
the proof for the strict modalities is analogous using P<.
As in [BEGR09] is easy to see that e(v,✸(ϕ ≈ a)) =
∨
w:e(w,ϕ)=a
P (v, w).
Then
e(v,∆(b→ ✸(ϕ ≈ a))) =


1, if b 6
∨
w:e(w,ϕ)=a
P (v, w)
0, otherwise
Let us denote δa(ϕ) := ∆(b → ✸(ϕ ≈ a)), and S = {a ∈ B : b 6∨
w:e(w,ϕ)=a
P (v, w)}. Then the previous equality implies
e(v, δa(ϕ))→ a) =
{
a, if a ∈ S
1, otherwise
It is a simple calculation to see that S = {e(w,ϕ) : b 6 P (v, w)}. Then, we
conclude the proof, since
e(v,
∧
a∈B
δa(ϕ)→ a)) =
∧
S =
∧
b6P (v,w)
e(w,ϕ) = e(v,bϕ)
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It is nor clear how to produce an axiomatization for the fragment with only
,< and A (and the corresponding definable dual ✸-like operations) of the
logic PB plus ∆. In this way, we will be able to avoid using the graded modali-
ties b and 
<
b . In order to do so, it is first easy to provide an axiomatic system
for the whole logic PB plus ∆ by adding to mMB an axiomatization for ∆ on
B (see eg. [Ha´j98], [VEG17b]) and the interaction −∆ axioms
∆bϕ→ b∆ϕ for b ∈ B, and ∆
<
b ϕ→ 
<
b ∆ϕ for all b ∈ B
+
These latter axioms are only necessary to prove the meta-rule
Γ ⊢ ϕ⇒ bΓ ⊢ bϕ,
and the corresponding one for <b . Having that, the completeness proof coin-
cides with the ones done for the logics without ∆, simply defining the worlds
of the canonical model as homomorphisms into the algebra B extended with
∆. From here, it is clear that we can use the interdefinability of b,✸b from ✸
proven above, and obtain in that way an axiomatic system complete with re-
spect to the intended semantics, over the language with only the original modal
operators and the new ∆.
Nevertheless, this axiomatization is still complete with respect to a conser-
vative expansion of the intended graded preferences logic, since the language
has been expanded with ∆. Being conservative, any deduction in the restricted
language holds in the logic if and only if it holds in the intended preference logic,
but removing ∆ would still be an interesting problem to face, even though it
is not clear if it can be solved (namely, if the logic with ,<,A has a finite
axiomatization).
7 Modeling fuzzy preferences on propositions
The preference models introduced above are a very natural setting to formally
address and reason over graded or fuzzy preferences over non-classical contexts.
They are similar to the (classical) preference models studied by van Benthem et.
al in [vBGR09], but offering a lattice of values (and so, a many-valued frame-
work) where to evaluate both the truth degrees of formulas and the accessibility
(preference) relation. The latter can be naturally interpreted as a graded pref-
erence relation between possible worlds or states (assignments of truth-values
to variables). The question is then how to lift a (fuzzy) preference relation 6
on worlds to (fuzzy) preference relations among formulas.
In the classical case, for instance in [vBGR09, EGV18] the following six
extensions are considered, where [ϕ] and [ψ] denote the set of models of propo-
sitions ϕ and ψ respectively:
• ϕ 6∃∃ ψ iff ∃u ∈ [ϕ], ∃v ∈ [ψ] such that P (u, v)
• ϕ 6∃∀ ψ iff ∃u ∈ [ϕ], such that ∀v ∈ [ψ], P (u, v)
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• ϕ 6∀∃ ψ iff ∀u ∈ [ϕ], ∃v ∈ [ψ] such that P (u, v)
• ϕ 6∀∀ ψ iff ∀u ∈ [ϕ] and ∀v ∈ [ψ], P (u, v)
• ϕ 6∃∀2 ψ iff ∃v ∈ [ψ], such that ∀u ∈ [ϕ], P (u, v)
• ϕ 6∀∃2 ψ iff ∀v ∈ [ψ], ∃u ∈ [ϕ] such that P (u, v)
Analogous expressions could be obtained by replacing P by its strict counterpart
P<. However, not all these extensions can be expressed in our framework, even
if we restrict ourselves to classical propositions and classical preference relations.
For instance, we can indeed express the orderings 6∃∃ and 6∀∃ (and their strict
counterparts) as follows:
• ϕ 6∃∃ ψ := E(ϕ ∧✸ψ) ϕ <∃∃ ψ := E(ϕ ∧✸<ψ)
• ϕ 6∀∃ ψ := A(ϕ→ ✸ψ) ϕ <∀∃ ψ := A(ϕ→ ✸<ψ)
but some others would need to consider the inverse preorder P−1 of P in the
models or to assume the preorder P be total, and some other are not just
expressible (see [vBGR09]). On the other hand, not all the extensions of the
weak orderings above are also equally reasonable, for instance some of them
are not even preorders. This is not the case of 6∀∃ and 6∀∃2, that are indeed
preorders.
In [EGV18] the authors have generalized the above classical definitions by
allowing preference relations P to be graded or many-valued (with values in a
scale B), while keeping the propositions Boolean. Then, the extensions of the
above orderings become graded as well, by replacing ∀’s and ∃’s by
∧
’s and
∨
’s
respectively, for instance:
• [ϕ 6∃∃ ψ] =
∨
u∈[ϕ]
∨
v∈[ψ] P (u, v)
• [ϕ 6∀∃ ψ] =
∧
u∈[ϕ]
∨
v∈[ψ] P (u, v)
It is worth pointing out that these expressions formally coincide with the way
the modal formulas E(ϕ ∧✸ψ) and A(ϕ→ ✸ψ) respectively are evaluated in a
B-preference model when the propositions ϕ and ψ are Boolean.
Example 7.1. Continuing Example 4.2, we can use the preference relation
between alternatives or worlds to illustrate concepts holding in our model. For
instance, for ϕ, ψ crisp-valued formulas, [ϕ 6∃∃ ψ] > α if and only if there
is some alternative where ψ holds that is preferred with degree at least α to
some alternative where ϕ holds. Similarly, [ϕ 6∀∃ ψ] > α if and only for
each alternative where ϕ holds there is some alternative where ψ holds that is
preferred at least in degree α.
In particular, in the model from Example 4.2, it is easy to compute the
following values:
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• [f 6∀∃ m] = 0.5 = [m 6∀∃ f ], expressing that, in general, the agent does
not have a clear preference of fish over meat nor vice-versa.
• [f 6∃∃ m] = 0.7, while [m 6∃∃ f ] = 0.8, which indicate there is some
alternative with fish strongly preferred (0.8) to some alternative with meat,
but there is also some alternative with meat quite preferred (0.7) to some
alternative with fish.
• [b∧m 6∀∃ b∧ f ] = 0.8, that can be understood as a contextual preference,
that is, fixing b as context (meaning only alternatives where the agent is
in the beach are considered), while in general fish was not preferred over
meat as we saw above, if the agent is on the beach, fish is strictly preferred.
In the full many-valued case of the logic PB, where both propositions and
preference relations are valued on a (same) scale B, the formulas
E(ϕ ∧✸ψ), E(ϕ ∧✸<ψ)
A(ϕ→ ✸ψ), A(ϕ→ ✸<ψ)
make full sense as graded generalizations of the 6∃∃, <∃∃ and 6∀∃, <∀∃ prefer-
ence orderings respectively. We will keep using the same notations ϕ 6∃∃ ψ,
ϕ <∃∃ ψ, ϕ 6∀∃ ψ, and ϕ <∀∃ ψ to refer to the PB-formulas E(ϕ ∧ ✸ψ),
E(ϕ ∧✸<ψ), A(ϕ→ ✸ψ) and A(ϕ→ ✸<ψ) respectively.
Note that, since the modalities E and A are universal, the values of these
formulas in a preference model do not depend on the particular worls where
they are evaluated.
In particular, it can be shown that these generalisations of 6∀∃ and <∀∃
satisfy the properties in the next lemma.
Lemma 7.2. The following properties hold:
(i) 6∀∃ is a reflexive and ⊙-transitive relation on formulas, i.e. we have the
following validities:
PB ϕ 6∀∃ ϕ,
PB (ϕ 6∀∃ ψ)→ ((ψ 6∀∃ χ)→ (ϕ 6∀∃ χ)).
(ii) <∀∃ is ⊙-transitive:
PB (ϕ <∀∃ ψ)→ ((ψ <∀∃ χ)→ (ϕ <∀∃ χ))
Proof. (i) Reflexivity of 6∀∃: A(ϕ → ✸ϕ) is valid in PB, since ϕ→ ✸ϕ (i.e.
axiom (4✸)) is valid in PB.
⊙-Transitivity of 6∀∃: one can show that
A(ϕ→ ✸ψ)⊙ A(ψ → ✸χ)→ A(ϕ→ ✸χ) (2)
is also a valid formula in PB. Namely, this follows by first showing that
the following formula expressing a form of monotonicity for ✸ holds true
in PB:
A(ϕ→ ψ)→ A(✸ϕ→ ✸ψ).
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This in turn leads to the valid formula A(ψ → ✸χ) → A(✸ψ → ✸✸χ),
but since ✸✸χ→ ✸χ holds true in PB (Axiom 4), we get
A(ϕ→ ✸ψ)⊙ A(ψ → ✸χ)→ A(ϕ→ ✸ψ)⊙ A(✸ψ → ✸χ),
and by axiom K for A, it follows the validity of
A(ϕ→ ✸ψ)⊙ A(✸ψ → ✸χ)→ A(ϕ→ ✸χ),
that directly allows us to show the validity of (2).
(ii) The proof is completely analogous to the case of 6∀∃.
Example 7.3. Still continuing with the preference model used in Example 4.2
and the computations therein, we can now ask for instance to which degrees the
agent prefers a light meal to a heavy meal and viceversa, always according to
the preference order 6∀∃:
7
• e(l 6∀∃ h) =
∧
v∈W e(v, l)→ e(v,✸h) =
min(0.8→ 0.3, 0.2→ 0.7, 0.8→ 0.4, 0.2→ 0.7) = 0.8→ 0.3 = 0.5
• e(h 6∀∃ l) =
∧
v∈W e(v, h)→ e(v,✸l) =
min(0.3→ 0.8, 0.7→ 0.6, 0.3→ 0.6, 0.7→ 0.4) = 0.7→ 0.4 = 0.7
Thus, in general, the agent prefers a bit more a light meal to a heavy meal (0.7)
than the other way round (0.5).
It is clear then that in the frame of the PB logic one can suitably encode
(weak and strict) preferences of a fuzzy proposition ψ over another ϕ by the
formulas ϕ 6∀∃ ψ and ϕ <∀∃ ψ respectively. These preferences between propo-
sitions actually enjoy the properties of a fuzzy ⊙-preorder in the case of 6∀∃
while <∀∃ is only ⊙-transitive.
Moreover, once could express contextual or conditional fuzzy preferences.
For instance, regarding the above example, we could be interested in evaluate
the preferences between a light and a heavy meal (l and h) given the agent finds
himself at a beach place (b). Here b is taken as the context that restricts the set
of possible worlds, that is, we are led to evaluate the preferences between b ∧ l
and b ∧ h. In general. we can consider contextual preferences of the form
δ : ϕ 6∀∃ ψ
standing for an abbreviation of (δ ∧ ϕ) 6∀∃ (δ ∧ ψ), where δ is a (fuzzy) non-
modal formula. Analogously for 6∃∃, <∃∃, and <∀∃.
7Note that we obviate the specification of the world when evaluating the two preference
statements as they ae independent of the world.
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Example 7.4. Continuing Example 7.3, we ask ourselves how much the values
of the preference expressions l 6∀∃ h and h 6∀∃ l change when the context is
that the agent is at a beach zone. That is, let us compute the values of the
contextual expressions b : l 6∀∃ h and b : h 6∀∃ l. We first compute the values
of the new modalities:
P bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
bm 0.8 1 0.6 0.8
cf 0.8 0.5 1 0.7
cm 0.6 0.5 0.5 1
◦
b ∧ h
0.3
0.7
0
0
=
✸(b ∧ h)
0.3
0.7
0.2
0.2
P bf bm cf cm
bf 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
bm 0.8 1 0.6 0.8
cf 0.8 0.5 1 0.7
cm 0.6 0.5 0.5 1
◦
b ∧ l
0.8
0.2
0
0
=
✸(b ∧ l)
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4
and hence, we finally have:
• e(b : l 6∀∃ h) =
∧
v∈W e(v, b ∧ l)→ e(v,✸(b ∧ h)) =
min(0.8→ 0.3, 0.2→ 0.7, 0→ 0.2, 0→ 0.2) = 0.8→ 0.3 = 0.5
• e(b : h 6∀∃ l) =
∧
v∈W e(v, b ∧ h)→ e(v,✸(b ∧ l)) =
min(0.3→ 0.8, 0.7→ 0.6, 0→ 0.6, 0→ 0.4) = 0.7→ 0.6 = 0.9
Therefore, one can observe that, in the context of being at the beach, the pref-
erence for a light meal to a heavy meal has increased (0.9) while the preference
for a heavy meal to a light meal keeps being the same (0.5).
In this last example we have considered the context described by a two-
valued formula (b), but nothing would change if the context would have been
described by a genuine fuzzy formula. Moreover, note that in the logic PB one
could also express somewhat more involved preference statements of the form
“the more I prefer fish to meat, the more I prefer light to heavy meals” by means
of the implication
(m 6∀∃ f)→ (h 6∀∃ l).
Indeed, if such an implication is assumed to be true, then it forces the truth-
value of the formula h 6∀∃ l (i.e. the degree to which I prefer light to heavy
meals) to be grater or equal to the truth-value of m 6∀∃ l (i.e. the degree to
which I prefer fish to meat).
To be more precise, the following graded version of modus ponens is valid in
PB:
r → (m 6∀∃ f), s→ ((m 6∀∃ f)→ (h 6∀∃ l)) ⊢PB s⊙ t→ (h 6∀∃ l)
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for any truth-values s, t ∈ B. Note that the textual description above corre-
sponds to this inference pattern in the particular case when t = 1, and hence
when s ⊙ t = s. In the general case, we still have that the greater are s and t,
the greater is s⊙ t.
8 Conclusions and Future work
The aim of this work is to provide a formal framework generalizing the treatment
of preferences in the style of eg. [vBGR09] to a fuzzy context. We have first
presented an axiomatic system encompassing reflexive and transitive modali-
ties plus universal operators, that is shown to be the syntactical counterpart of
many-valued Kripke models with (reflexive and transitive) graded (weak) pref-
erence relations between possible worlds or states. It is based on considering the
cuts of the relations over the elements of the algebra of evaluation, solving in this
way some problems arising from [VEG17a]. We further consider the extension
of the previous logical system to cases when strict preferences (associated to the
previous weak preferences) are taken into account. We propose an axiomatic
system complete with respect to this intended semantic. We also show how to
axiomatize the previous logics without relying in cutting the relations over the
elements of the algebra, but instead expanding the language with only one new
operation, the projection connective ∆. This logical framework stands towards
the use of modal many-valued logics in the representation and management of
graded preferences, in the analogous fashion that (classical) modal logic has
served in the analogous Boolean preference setting.
In solving the previous questions, we close in a positive way an open prob-
lem from [BEGR11] concerning the inter-definability of modal operators on the
minimal modal logic over a finite residuated lattice.
It is still fairly unexplored the use of this framework to model graded prefer-
ences. We have presented several examples to illustrate some of the possibilities
the proposed logical setting offers, and partially developed the study of graded
preferences between propositions in Section 7, but still posing many challenges
and open questions. Further, we consider it could be interesting to observe the
previous formal systems under the light of, instead modeling preference rela-
tions, serving as a framework of cost/pay-off related systems, relating the cost
of certain executions in a given configuration (i.e., evaluation of some formula
in some world of a model) and the cost of changing to a different configuration
(i.e., the weight of the accessibility relation). Interestingly enough, the strict
modalities also enjoy a natural counterpart, forcing a change of configuration
at each moment of the execution.
From a more theoretical point of view, the study of the previous systems
over other classes of algebras of truth-values (e.g. including infinite algebras like
those defined on the real unit interval [0, 1] underlying  Lukasiewicz, Product or
Go¨del fuzzy logics) seems also of great interest, both from a theoretical point of
view and towards the modelization of situations needing of continuous sets of
values.
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A Appendix: Minimal modal logics of a finite
residuated lattice
For the sake of being self-contained, in this appendix we recall from [BEGR11]
the main components of the minimal modal logic over a finite residuated lat-
tice B, and of the modal logic considering only models with crisp accessibility
relation. The logics axiomatized by Bou et. al in the previous paper is the -
fragment, but as we proved in Proposition 3.3, in the language with constants
(which is the case in this work, and also in [BEGR11]) ✸ can be defined from
. Thus, the logics MB and CMB detailed below also axiomatize the logic with
both modalities.
We recall from Section 3 the basic propositional setting. We assume
B = (B,∧,∨,⊙,→, 0, 1) is a finite (bounded, integral, commutative) residu-
ated lattice, and we also consider its canonical expansion Bc by adding a new
constant b for every element b ∈ B (canonical in the sense that the interpretation
of b in Bc is a itself.) The logic associated with Bc is denoted by Λ(Bc), and
its logical consequence relation |=Bc is defined in the usual way and specified in
Section 3.
The language of the minimum modal logic over Bc is defined as usual from
a set of propositional variables V , 0-ary truth constants {b : b ∈ B}, binary
propositional connectives {∧,∨,⊙,→} and unary modal operator . We let
MFm be the set of formulas build inductively in the usual way, namely,
• Any variable and constant symbol is a formula,
• Given a formula ϕ, ϕ is a formula, and
• Given two formulas ϕ, ψ, and any binary propositional connective ⋆ ∈
{∧,∨,⊙,→}, (ϕ ⋆ ψ) is a formula.
No other sequence of symbols is a formula. We will remove parentheses when
they are redundant, and consider conjunction, disjunctions or products of in-
dexed families of formulas (non-ambiguous in our logics because of the commu-
tativity of these operators).
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Some additional operations can be obtained as abbreviations of the original
language, namely for ϕ, ψ ∈MFm, we let:
• ¬ϕ := ϕ→ 0,
• ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ)⊙ (ψ → ϕ),
• ✸ϕ :=
∧
b∈B((ϕ→ a)→ a).
Kripke-style semantics for the modal logic is defined as follows. An B-Kripke
model is a triple M = 〈W,R, e〉 where W is a set of worlds, R : W ×W → B,
is a B-valued accessibility relation between worlds, and e : W × V → B is the
evaluation of the model, which is uniquely extended to formulas as usual for the
propositional connectives and for the modal operator by letting:
e(w,ϕ) :=
∧
w∈W
{R(v, w)→ e(w,ϕ)}
From Proposition 3.3, we know that e(v,✸ϕ) =
∨
w∈W
{R(v, w)⊙ e(w,ϕ)}
We let MB denote the class of all B-Kripke models, and the corresponding
notion of (local) consequence relation will be denoted by MB .
The axiomatic system MB presented below is the logic denoted by Λ(Fr,B
c)
in [BEGR11, Def. 4.6], defined by:
1. an axiomatic basis for Λ(Bc) (see Appendix A from [BEGR11])
2. modal axioms for :
1,
(MD) (ϕ ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ),
(Axb) (b→ ϕ)↔ (b→ ϕ)
3. The rules of the basis for Λ(Bc) and the Monotonicity rule:
(Mon) : from ϕ→ ψ derive ϕ→ ψ.
The corresponding notion of proof is denoted by ⊢MB .
Theorem A.1 ((Th. 4.11, [BEGR11]) Completeness of MB). For any subset
of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ ⊢MB ϕ iff Γ MB ϕ.
In the case B is a finite MTL-chain, consider the subclass CMB ⊆ MB
consisting of models 〈W,R, e〉 with R being a crisp accessibility relation (namely,
R ⊆ W × W ). Then, the corresponding logic is given by the system CMB
obtained by extending MB with the following two additional axiom:
• Axiom C : (k∨ϕ)→ k∨ϕ, where k is the co-atom (i.e., the immediate
predecessor of 1 in the algebra) of B;
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This axiomatic is the one denoted by Λ(CFr,Bc) in [Def. 4.16][BEGR11].
Further, it is easy to see it is equivalent to the one obtained by adding the
K axiom
K : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ),
and changing the (Mon) rule to the Necessitation rule:
N : from ϕ derive ϕ
The completeness proof for CMB is analogous to the one for the logic
Theorem A.2 ((Th. 4.22, [BEGR11]) Completeness of CMB). Let B be a
finite MTL-chain. Then, for any subset of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ ⊢CMB ϕ iff
Γ CMB ϕ.
B Appendix: Construction and correctness of
the Bulldozed Model
We will see how the canonical model Mc from Section 5.3 can be deformed so
no P<b cycles are present. The following lemma shows how several strict clusters
(i.e., maximal sets with respect to P<b ∩ (P
<
b )
−1) interacting have a very well
behaved structure.
Lemma B.1. Let a 6 b ∈ A and Ca, Cb be respectively a P<a and a P
<
b cluster
in W such that Ca ∩Cb 6= ∅. Then Cb ⊆ Ca.
Moreover, if a < b, then for any a < c < b there is a P<c cluster C
c such
that Cb ⊆ Cc ⊆ Ca.
Proof. The first part follows by the ∧-transitivity of P<. The second is due to
the fact that, for b 6 c, any P<b cluster is inside a P
<
c cluster.
Before defining the Bulldozed model, allow us to introduce some sets of
worlds from the canonical model and built from them.
1. Consider for each b ∈ B, each P<b cluster, and index them by {C
b
i }i∈Ib for
suitable families of indexes Ib;
2. Use the following recursive procedure to obtain a strict order <bi for each
one of the previous clusters Cbi :
Ordering(Cxj ):
• If there is no a > x and Cas such that C
a
s ⊆ C
x
j , let <
x
j be
any arbitrary strict ordering of Cxj (any order is compatible
with P<x in it, from Lemma 5.6).
• Otherwise, let y be the immediate successor of x in A, and
let Cyj1 , . . . C
y
jk
all the (disjoint) different P<y clusters inside
Cxj . Call Ordering(C
y
jn
) for each of them, obtaining strict
orderings <yj1 , . . . <
y
jk
of each of the previous sub-clusters.
35
Let then <xj be any ordering of the full C
x
j compatible with
each <yjn . This ordering exists because the subclusters are
all disjoint by definition, and fully contained in Cxj due to
Lemma B.1. Further, it is compatible with P<x in C
x
j , since
any strict order is so from Lemma 5.6.
3. For each cluster Cbi let T
b
i := {〈v, n〉 : v ∈ C
b
i , n ∈ Z}; It is possible that
T ai ∩ T
b
j 6= ∅, for a 6= b (if there are nested clusters), but T
b
i ∩ T
b
j = ∅
whenever i 6= j.
The bulldozed model is T = 〈T, {Sb}b∈B, {S
<
b }b∈B+ , f〉 where:
• Let W− be the worlds of the canonical model that do not belong to any
cluster, and then let T = W− ∪
⋃
b∈B+
⋃
i∈Ib
T bi ;
• f(v, p) = e(v, p) for any v ∈ W−, and f(〈v, n〉b, p) = f(v, a) for any other
world in T ;
• For each b ∈ B+, we will first define the strict accessibility relations S<b ,
by considering the different cases:
– If either v or w belong to W \
⋃
i∈Ib
Cbi (i.e., outside any P
<
b -cluster),
the the relation P<b held condition (1 implies 2a): it is simple to see
that indeed, either P<b (v, w) = 0 or P
<
b (w, v) = 0, since otherwise
both elements would belong to some P<b cluster. Thus, we simply let
S<b (v, w) if and only if


P<b (v, w) v, w ∈ W
−
P<b (v, u) v ∈W
−, w = 〈u, n〉
P<b (u,w) w ∈W
−, v = 〈u, n〉
– If v ∈ Cbi and w ∈ C
b
j for i 6= j (i.e., to different P
<
b clusters), they are
also well-behaved in the sense that either P<b (v, w) = 0 or P
<
b (w, v) =
0 (otherwise, they would belong to the same cluster). Then, again, for
any m,n ∈ Z, let
S<b (〈v, n〉, 〈w,m〉) if and only if P
<
b (v, w).
– If v, w ∈ Cbi , then define
S<b (〈v, n〉, 〈w,m〉) if and only if
{
n < m, or
n = m and v <bi w
(<bi being the strict order within the cluster from point 2. above)
• We let S0 = T 2, and we let Sb to be the reflexive closure of S
<
b , i.e.,
Sb(y, z) if and only if S
<
b (y, z) or y = z (in T ).
We need to check that the bulldozed model is indeed behaving as the canon-
ical one, and also, that in it, the conditions relating Sb and S
<
b hold. The fact
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that the resulting fuzzy relation S(v, w) = maxb∈ASb(v, w) holds the conditions
of an B-preference model follow from the fact that Sb is reflexive (by its own
definition) and ∧-transitive (because the S<b are).
In order to prove the equivalence of both models, let us introduce a mapping
β : W → P(T ) pairing each world from Mc with all the ones it generates in T
in the obvious way, namely:
β(w) :=
{
{w} if w ∈ W−
{〈w, n〉 : n ∈ Z} otherwise.
It will be useful the following simple result, slightly stronger than the basic
(classical) bisimilarity of Mc and T.
Lemma B.2. Let v ∈W . Then
1. For any w ∈ W such that Pb(v, w) (resp. P
<
b (v, w)) and any u ∈ β(w)
there is z ∈ β(w) with Sb(u, z) (resp. S
<
b (u, z)).
2. For any u ∈ β(v) and any z ∈ T such that Sb(u, z) (resp. S
<
b (u, z)) there
is w ∈ W such that z ∈ β(w) and Pb(v, w) (resp. P
<
b (v, w).
Proof. 1. If either one of v or w is outside all P<b clusters, or if they belong
to different ones, any z ∈ β(w) serves, since the relations were preserved
from the canonical model. Otherwise, we know u = 〈v, n〉 for some n ∈
Z. Then, for any n < m it holds that S<b (〈v, n〉, 〈w,m〉) (and thus, also
Sb(〈v, n〉, 〈w,m〉)).
2. By definition of T , z ∈ β(w) for some w ∈ W . Now, if one of v, w did not
belong to any P<b cluster, or if they belonged to different ones, we know
again by definition that Sb(u, z) if and only if Pb(v, w) (and the same for
what concerns S<b and P
<
b ), proving the claim.
Otherwise it means that both v, w belonged to the same P<b cluster, so
trivially P<b (v, w) and Pb(v, w).
Corollary B.3. For any v ∈ W and any ϕ ∈ PFm,
{e(w,ϕ) : Pb(v, w)} = {f(z, ϕ) : Sb(u, z)}, for any u ∈ β(v)
Proof. It follows by induction on the complexity of ϕ, being the initial step due
to the previous lemma and the definition of f for propositional variables.
From the previous, it trivially follows that the bulldozed model behaves like
the original one, namely:
Lemma B.4. For any formula ϕ ∈ PFm and any world v ∈ W , e(v, ϕ) =
f(u, ϕ) for any u ∈ β(v).
We only need to check that indeed the new model is a preference model.
Reflexivity and transitivity of Sb follow by definition and by transitivity of S
<
b
(which holds by definition in the additional sets of worlds, and because P<b was
transitive itself).
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Lemma B.5. For any v, w ∈ T and any b ∈ B+ the following are equivalent:
1. S<b (v, w)
2. a) Sb(v, w) and b) not Sb(w, v).
Proof. Assume v ∈ β(x), w ∈ β(y) (with possibly x = y).
To show 1 implies 2, assume that S<b (v, w). By definition of S
<
b , necessarily
v 6= w. If either x or y did not belong to any P<b cluster, or if they belong to
different clusters, we know by definition that Pb(x, y) = 1, and also Pb(y, x) = 0
(otherwise, from Lemma 5.6, they would belong to the same P<b cluster). Since
in this case we defined Sb(v, w) = Pb(x, y) and Sb(w, v) = Pb(y, x), this proves
the implication. Suppose on the contrary that both x, y belong to the same
P<b cluster. Then, in the way we defined S
<
b for the elements of the unraveled
cluster, there were no cycles, so S<b (w, v) = 0. Since Sb in these worlds is the
reflexive closure of S<b , we get that Sb(v, w) and not Sb(w, v).
To check that 2 implies 1, assume Sb(v, w) and not Sb(w, v). As before, if
either x or y did not belong to any P<b cluster, or if they belong to different
clusters, we know that then Pb(x, y) and not Pb(y, x). Then, from Lemma 5.5,
we know that P<b (x, y), and thus S
<
b (v, w) (again because x, y belong to different
P<b -cluster, so S
<
b equals P
<
b ).
On the other hand, suppose both x, y belong to the same P<b cluster. In
that case, Sb is defined as the reflexive closure of S
<
b , so the assumptions imply
that necessarily S<b (v, w).
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